"The population of Balmer Island increases to 100,000 duing the summer months. To reduce
the number of accidents involving mopeds and pedestrians, the town council of Balmer Island.,
should limit the number of mopeds rented by each of the island's six moped and bicycle rental
companies from 50 per day to 30 per day during the summer season. By limiting the number of
rentals, the town council is sure to attain the 50 percent reduction in moped accidents that was
achieved last year in the neighboring island of Torseau, when Torseau's town council enforced
similar limits on moped rentals."
The author of this editorial recommends that to reduce accidents involving mopeds and
pedestrians Balmer Island's city council should restrict moped rentals to 30 per day, down from
50, at each of the island's six rental outlets. To support this recommendation the author cites
the fact that last year, when nearby Torseau Island's town council enforced similar measures,
Torseau's rate of moped accidents fell by 50%. For several reasons, this evidence provides
scant support for the author's recommendation.
To begin with, the author assumes that all other conditions in Balmer that might affect the
rate of moped-pedestrian accidents will remain unchanged after the restrictions are enacted.
However, with a restricted supply of rental mopeds people in Balmer might purchase mopeds
instead. Also, the number of pedestrians might increase in the future; with more pedestrians,
especially tourists, the risk of moped-pedestrian accidents would probably increase. For that
matter, the number of rental outlets might increase to make up for the artificial supply
restriction per outlet--a likely scenario assuming moped rental demand does not decline.
Without considering and ruling out these and other possible changes that might contribute to a
high incidence of moped-pedestrian accidents, the author cannot convince me that the
proposed restrictions will necessarily have the desired effect.
Next, the author fails to consider other possible explanations for the 50% decline in
Torseau's moped accident rate last year. Perhaps last year Torseau experienced unusually fair
weather, during which moped accidents are less likely. Perhaps fewer tourists visited Tot sean
last year than during most years, thereby diminishing the demand for rental mopeds to below
the allowed limits. Perhaps last year some of Torseau's moped rental outlets purchased new
mopeds that are safer to drive. Or perhaps the restrictions were already in effect but were not
enforced until last year. In any event, a decline in Torseau's moped accident rate during only
one year is scarcely sufficient to draw any reliable conclusions about what might have caused
the decline, or about what the accident rate will be in years ahead.
Additionally, in asserting that the same phenomenon that caused a 50% decline in moped
accidents in Torseau would cause a similar decline in Balmer, the author relies on what might
amount to an unfair analogy between Balmer and Torseau. Perhaps Balmer's ability to enforce
moped-rental restrictions does not meet Torseau's ability; if not, then the mere enactment of
similar restrictions in Balmer is no guarantee of a similar result. Or perhaps the demand for
mopeds in Torseau is always greater than in Balmer. Specifically, if fewer than all available
mopeds are currently rented per day from the average Balmer outlet, while in Torseau every
available moped is rented each day, then the proposed restriction is likely to have less impact
on the accident rate in Balmer than in Torseau.
Finally, the author provides no evidence that the same restrictions that served to reduce the
incidence of all "moped accidents" by 50% would also serve to reduce the incidence of
accidents involving "mopeds and pedestrians" by 50%. Lacking such evidence, it is entirely
possible that the number of moped accidents not involving pedestrians decreased by a greater
percentage, while the number of moped-pedestrian accidents decreased by a smaller
percentage, or even increased. Since the author has not accounted for these possibilities, the
editorial's recommendation cannot be taken seriously.
In conclusion, the recommendation is not well supported. To convince me that the proposed
restriction would achieve the desired outcome, the author would have to assure me that no
changes serving to increase Balmer's moped-pedestrian accident rate will occur in the
foreseeable future. The author must also provide dear evidence that last year's decline in
moped accidents in Torseau was attributable primarily to its moped rental restrictions rather
than to one or more other factors. In order to better evaluate the recommendation, I would
need more information comparing the supply of and demand for moped rentals on the two
islands. I would also need to know the rate of mopedpedestrian accidents in Torseau both prior
to and after the restrictions were enforced in Torseau.
Reprove others but correct yourself
Wednesday, June 16, 2010
Tuesday, June 15, 2010
ASCRIBE, ATTRIBUTE, ASSIGN, IMPUTE, CREDIT
ASCRIBE, ATTRIBUTE, ASSIGN, IMPUTE, CREDIT mean to lay something to the account of a person or thing.
ASCRIBE suggests an inferring or conjecturing of cause, quality, authorship *forged paintings formerly ascribed to masters*.
ATTRIBUTE suggests less tentativeness than ASCRIBE, less definiteness than ASSIGN *attributed to Rembrandt but possibly done by an associate*.
ASSIGN implies ascribing with certainty or after deliberation *assigned the bones to the Cretaceous Period*.
IMPUTE suggests ascribing something that brings discredit by way of accusation or blame *tried to impute sinister motives to my actions*.
CREDIT implies ascribing a thing or especially an action to a person or other thing as its agent, source, or explanation *credited his teammates for his success*.
ASCRIBE suggests an inferring or conjecturing of cause, quality, authorship *forged paintings formerly ascribed to masters*.
ATTRIBUTE suggests less tentativeness than ASCRIBE, less definiteness than ASSIGN *attributed to Rembrandt but possibly done by an associate*.
ASSIGN implies ascribing with certainty or after deliberation *assigned the bones to the Cretaceous Period*.
IMPUTE suggests ascribing something that brings discredit by way of accusation or blame *tried to impute sinister motives to my actions*.
CREDIT implies ascribing a thing or especially an action to a person or other thing as its agent, source, or explanation *credited his teammates for his success*.
eur结尾表人
altruist:selflessness=connoisseur:expertise
connoisseur:art=gourmet:cuisine
connoisseur:painting,
consummate~~amateurish
credulity:dupe=discrimination:connoisseur
fawn:hauteur=selfdepreciate:swagger
fractious:umbrage=supercilious:hauteur
grandeur~~frivolous
hauteur:supercilious
hauteur~~humility
heretic:dissent=connoisseur:excel
intentionality:accidental=grandeur:mean
poseur:sincerity=recluse:gregariousness
poseur~~sincere person
raconteur:storytelling=wordsmith:writing
recluse:gregariousness=poseur:sincerity
saboteur:disrupt=apologist:defend
selflessness:altruist=expertise:connoisseur
stickler:derelict=poseur:unaffected
supercilious:hauteur
supercilious:hauteur=fractious:umbrage
wordsmith:writing=raconteur:storytelling
ingrate
: an ungrateful person
grandeur
1 : the quality or state of being grand : MAGNIFICENCE *the glory that was Greece and the grandeur that was Rome — E. A. Poe*
2 : an instance or example of grandeur
hauteur
: ARROGANCE, HAUGHTINESS
Etymology:French, from haut high — more at HAUGHTY
PROUD, ARROGANT, HAUGHTY, LORDLY, INSOLENT, OVERBEARING, SUPERCILIOUS, DISDAINFUL mean showing scorn for inferiors.
PROUD may suggest an assumed superiority or loftiness *too proud to take charity*.
ARROGANT implies a claiming for oneself of more consideration or importance than is warranted *a conceited and arrogant executive*.
HAUGHTY suggests a consciousness of superior birth or position *a haughty aristocrat*.
LORDLY implies pomposity or an arrogant display of power *a lordly condescension*.
INSOLENT implies contemptuous haughtiness *ignored by an insolent waiter*.
OVERBEARING suggests a tyrannical manner or an intolerable insolence *an overbearing supervisor*.
SUPERCILIOUS implies a cool, patronizing haughtiness *an aloof and supercilious manner*.
DISDAINFUL suggests a more active and openly scornful superciliousness *disdainful of their social inferiors*
connoisseur:art=gourmet:cuisine
connoisseur:painting,
consummate~~amateurish
credulity:dupe=discrimination:connoisseur
fawn:hauteur=selfdepreciate:swagger
fractious:umbrage=supercilious:hauteur
grandeur~~frivolous
hauteur:supercilious
hauteur~~humility
heretic:dissent=connoisseur:excel
intentionality:accidental=grandeur:mean
poseur:sincerity=recluse:gregariousness
poseur~~sincere person
raconteur:storytelling=wordsmith:writing
recluse:gregariousness=poseur:sincerity
saboteur:disrupt=apologist:defend
selflessness:altruist=expertise:connoisseur
stickler:derelict=poseur:unaffected
supercilious:hauteur
supercilious:hauteur=fractious:umbrage
wordsmith:writing=raconteur:storytelling
ingrate
: an ungrateful person
grandeur
1 : the quality or state of being grand : MAGNIFICENCE *the glory that was Greece and the grandeur that was Rome — E. A. Poe*
2 : an instance or example of grandeur
hauteur
: ARROGANCE, HAUGHTINESS
Etymology:French, from haut high — more at HAUGHTY
PROUD, ARROGANT, HAUGHTY, LORDLY, INSOLENT, OVERBEARING, SUPERCILIOUS, DISDAINFUL mean showing scorn for inferiors.
PROUD may suggest an assumed superiority or loftiness *too proud to take charity*.
ARROGANT implies a claiming for oneself of more consideration or importance than is warranted *a conceited and arrogant executive*.
HAUGHTY suggests a consciousness of superior birth or position *a haughty aristocrat*.
LORDLY implies pomposity or an arrogant display of power *a lordly condescension*.
INSOLENT implies contemptuous haughtiness *ignored by an insolent waiter*.
OVERBEARING suggests a tyrannical manner or an intolerable insolence *an overbearing supervisor*.
SUPERCILIOUS implies a cool, patronizing haughtiness *an aloof and supercilious manner*.
DISDAINFUL suggests a more active and openly scornful superciliousness *disdainful of their social inferiors*
Public figures such as actors, politicians, and athletes should expect people to be interested in their private lives.
Public figures such as actors, politicians, and athletes should expect people to be interested in their private lives. When they seek a public role, they should expect that they will lose at least some of their privacy.
This statement is fundamentally correct; public figures should indeed expect to lose their
privacy. After all, we are a society of voyeurs wishing to transform our mundane lives; and one
way to do so is to live vicariously through the experiences of others whose lives appear more
interesting than our own. Moreover, the media recognize this societal foible and exploit it at
every opportunity. Nevertheless, a more accurate statement would draw a distinction between
political figures and other public figures; the former have even less reason than the latter to
expect to be left alone, for the reason that their duty as public servants legitimizes public
scrutiny of their private lives.
The chief reason why I generally agree with the statement is that, for better or worse,
intense media attention to the lives of public figures raises a presumption in the collective mind
of the viewing or reading public that our public figures' lives are far more interesting than our
own. This presumption is understandable. After all, I think most people would agree that given
the opportunity for even fleeting fame they would embrace it without hesitation. Peering into
the private lives of those who have achieved our dreams allows us to live vicariously through
those lives.
Another reason why I generally agree with the statement has to do with the forces that
motivate the media. For the most part, the media consist of large corporations whose chief
objective is to maximize shareholder profits. In pursuit of that objective the media are simply
giving the public what they demand a voyeuristic look into the private lives of public figures.
One need look no further than a newsstand, local-television news broadcast, or talk show to
find ample evidence that this is so. For better or worse, we love to peer at people on public
pedestals, and we love to watch them fall off. The media know this all too well, and exploit our
obsession at every opportunity.
Nevertheless, the statement should be qualified in that a political figure has less reason to
expect privacy than other public figures. Why? The private affairs of public servants become
our business when those affairs adversely affect our servants' ability to serve us effectively, or
when our servants betray our trust. For example, several years ago the chancellor of a
university located in my city was expelled from office for misusing university funds to renovate
his posh personal residence. The scandal became front-page news in the campus newspaper,
and prompted a useful system-wide reform. Also consider the Clinton sex scandal, which
sparked a debate about the powers and duties of legal prosecutors vis4-vis the chief executive.
Also, the court rulings about executive privilege and immunity, and even the impeachment
proceedings, all of which resulted from the scandal, might serve as useful legal precedents for
the future.
Admittedly, intense public scrutiny of the personal lives of public figures can carry harmful
consequences, for the public figure as well as the society. For instance, the Clinton scandal
resulted in enormous financial costs to taxpayers, and it harmed many individuals caught up in
the legal process. And for more that a year the scandal served chiefly to distract us from our
most pressing national and global problems. Yet, until as a society we come to appreciate the
potentially harmful effects of our preoccupation with the lives of public figures, they can expect
to remain the cynosures of our attention.
Issue 17
"The primary goal of technological advancement should be to increase people's efficiency so
that everyone has more leisure time."
The speaker contends that technology's primary goal should be to increase our efficiency for
the purpose of affording us more leisure time. I concede that technology has enhanced our
efficiency as we go about our everyday lives. Productivity software helps us plan and
coordinate projects; intranets, the Internet, and satellite technology make us more efficient
messengers; and technology even helps us prepare our food and access entertainment more
efficiently. Beyond this concession, however, I find the speaker's contention indefensible from
both an empirical and a normative standpoint.
The chief reason for my disagreement lies in the empirical proof: with technological
advancement comes diminished leisure time. In 1960 the average U.S. family included only
one breadwinner, who worked just over 40 hours per week. Since then the average work week
has increased steadily to nearly 60 hours today; and in most families there are now two
breadwinners. What explains this decline in leisure despite increasing efficiency that new
technologies have brought about? I contend that technology itself is the culprit behind the
decline. We use the additional free time that technology affords us not for leisure but rather for
work. As computer technology enables greater and greater office productivity it also raises our
employers' expectations--or demands--for production. Further technological advances breed
still greater efficiency and, in turn, expectations. Our spiraling work load is only exacerbated by
the competitive business environment in which nearly all of us work today. Moreover, every
technological advance demands our time and attention in order to learn how to use the new
technology. Time devoted to keeping pace with technology depletes time for leisure activities.
I disagree with the speaker for another reason as well: the suggestion that technology's
chief goal should be to facilitate leisure is simply wrongheaded. There are far more vital
concerns that technology can and should address. Advances in bio-technology can help cure
and prevent diseases; advances in medical technology can allow for safer, less invasire
diagnosis and treatment; advances in genetics can help prevent birth defects; advances in
engineering and chemistry can improve the structural integrity of our buildings, roads, bridges
and vehicles; information technology enables education while communication technology
facilitates global participation in the democratic process. In short, health, safety, education, and
freedom--and not leisure--are the proper final objectives of technology. Admittedly, advances
in these areas sometimes involve improved efficiency; yet efficiency is merely a means to
these more important ends.
In sum, I find indefensible the speaker's suggestion that technology's value lies chiefly in the
efficiency and resulting leisure time it can afford us. The suggestion runs contrary to the
overwhelming evidence that technology diminishes leisure time, and it wrongly places leisure
ahead of goals such as health, safety, education, and freedom as technology's ultimate aims.
Issue 18
"Money spent on research is almost always a good investment, even when the results of that
research are controversial."
I agree with the speaker's broad assertion that money spent on research is generally money
well invested. However, the speaker unnecessarily extends this broad assertion to embrace
research whose results are "controversial," while ignoring certain compelling reasons why
some types of research might be unjustifiable. My points of contention with the speaker
involves the fundamental objectives and nature of research, as discussed below.
I concede that the speaker is on the correct philosophical side of this issue. After all,
research is the exploration of the unknown for true answers to our questions, and for lasting
solutions to our enduring problems. Research is also the chief means by which we humans
attempt to satisfy our insatiable appetite for knowledge, and our craving to understand
ourselves and the world around us. Yet, in the very notion of research also lies my first point of
contention with the speaker, who illogically presumes that we can know the results of research
before we invest in it. To the contrary, if research is to be of any value it must explore
uncharted and unpredictable territory. In fact, query whether research whose benefits are
immediate and predictable can break any new ground, or whether it can be considered
"research" at all.
While we must invest in research irrespective of whether the results might be controversial,
at the same time we should be circumspect about research whose objectives are too vague
and whose potential benefits are too speculative. After all, expensive research always carries
significant opportunity costs--in terms of how the money might be spent toward addressing
society's more immediate problems that do not require research. One apt illustration of this
point involves the so-called "Star Wars" defense initiative, championed by the Reagan
administration during the 1980s. In retrospect, this initiative was ill-conceived and largely a
waste of taxpayer dollars; and few would dispute that the exorbitant amount of money devoted
to the initiative could have gone a long way toward addressing pressing social problems of the
day--by establishing after-school programs for delinquent latchkey kids, by enhancing AIDS
awareness and education, and so forth. As it turns out, at the end of the Star Wars debacle we
were left with rampant gang violence, an AIDS epidemic, and an unprecedented federal
budget deficit.
The speaker's assertion is troubling in two other r~sp,ects as well. First, no amount of
research can completely solve the enduring pr~l~rm of war, poverty, and violence, for the
reason that they stem from certain aspects of human nature--such as aggression and greed.
Although human genome research might eventually enable us to engineer away those
undesirable aspects of our nature, in the meantime it is up to our economists, diplomats, social
reformers, and jurists--not our research laboratories--to mitigate these problems. Secondly, for
every new research breakthrough that helps reduce human suffering is another that serves
primarily to add to that suffering. For example, while some might argue that physics
researchers who harnessed the power of the atom have provided us with an alternative source
of energy and invaluable "peace-keepers," this argument flies in the face of the hundreds of
thousands of innocent people murdered and maimed by atomic blasts, and by nuclear
meltdowns. And, in fulfilling the promise of "better living through chemistry" research has given
us chemical weapons for human slaughter. In short, so-called "advances" that scientific
research has brought about often amount to net losses for humanity.
In sum, the speaker's assertion that we should invest in research whose results are
"controversial" begs the question, because we cannot know whether research will turn out
controversial until we've invested in it. As for the speaker's broader assertion, I agree that
money spent on research is generally a sound investment because it is an investment in the
advancement of human knowledge and in human imagination and spirit. Nevertheless, when
we do research purely for its own sake without aim or clear purpose--we risk squandering
resources which could have been applied to relieve the immediate suffering of our dispirited,
disadvantaged, and disenfranchised members of society. In the final analysis, given finite
economic resources we are forced to strike a balance in how we allocate those resources
among competing societal objectives.
Issue 19
"Creating an appealing image has become more important in contemporary society than is the
reality or truth behind that image."
Has creating an image become more important in our society than the reality or truth behind
the image? I agree that image has become a more central concern, at least where short-term
business or political success is at stake. Nevertheless, I think that in the longer term image
ultimately yields to substance and fact.
The important role of image is particularly evident in the business world. Consider, for
example, today's automobile industry. American cars are becoming essentially identical to
competing Japanese cars in nearly every mechanical and structural respect, as well as in price.
Thus to compete effectively auto companies must now differentiate their products largely
through image advertising, by conjuring up certain illusory benefits--such as machismo, status,
sensibility, or fun. The increasing focus on image is also evident in the book-publishing
business. Publishers are relying more and more on the power of their brands rather than the
content of their books. Today mass-market books are supplanted within a year with products
that are essential the same---except with fresh faces, rifles, and other promotional angles. I
find quite telling the fact that today more and more book publishers are being acquired by large
media companies. And the increasing importance of image is especially evident in the music
industry, where originality, artistic interpretation, and technical proficiency have yielded almost
entirely to sex appeal.
The growing significance of image is also evident in the political realm, particularly when it
comes to presidential politics. Admittedly, by its very nature politicking has always emphasized
rhetoric and appearances above substance and fact. Yet since the invention of the camera
presidential politicians have become increasingly concerned about their image. For example,
Teddy Roosevelt was very careful never to be photographed wearing a tennis outfit, for fear
that such photographs would serve to undermine his rough-rider image that won him his only
term in office. With the advent of television, image became even more central in presidential
politics. After all, it was television that elected J.F.K. over Nixon. And our only two-term
presidents in the television age were elected based largely on their image. Query whether
Presidents Lincoln, Taft, or even F.D.R. would be elected today if pitted against the handsome
leading man Reagan, or the suave and poliricaUy correct Clinton. After all, Lincoln was homely,
Taft was obese, and F.D.R. was crippled.
In the long term, however, the significance of image wanes considerably. The image of the
Marlboro man ultimately gave way to the truth about the health hazards of cigarette smoking.
Popular musical acts with nothing truly innovative to offer musically eventually disappear from
the music scene. And anyone who frequents yard sales knows that today's best-selling books
often become tomorrow's pulp. Even in politics, I think history has a knack for peeling away
image to focus on real accomplishments. I think history will remember Teddy Roosevelt, for
example, primarily for building the Panama Canal and for establishing our National Park
System--and not for his rough-and-ready wardrobe.
In the final analysis, it seems that in every endeavor where success depends to some
degree on persuasion, marketing, or salesmanship, image has indeed become the central
concern of those who seek to persuade. And as our lives become busier, our attention spans
briefer, and our choices among products and services greater, I expect this trend to continue
unabated--for better or worse.
Issue 20
"Most of the people we consider heroic today were, in fact, very ordinary people who
happened to be in the right place at the right time."
I agree with the statement insofar as our heroes tend to be ordinary people like us. However,
I strongly disagree with the further assertion that people become heroes simply by being "in
the right place at the right time." If we look around at the sorts of people we choose as our
heroes, we real/ze that heroism has far less to do with circumstance than with how a hero
responds to it.
I concede that heroes are generally ordinary people. In my observation we choose as our
heroes people with whom we strongly identify--people who are very much like us. In fact many
of us call a parent, grandparent, or older sibling our hero. Why? My intuition is that the more a
person shares in common with us----m terms of experience, heritage, disposition, motives, and
even physical attributes-----~e more accessible that person's heroic traits are to us, and the
stronger their attraction as a role model. And few would dispute that we share more in common
with immediately family than with anyone else.
However, the statement's further suggestion that people become heroes merely as a result
of circumstances not of their own choosing is simply wrongheaded. Admittedly, circumstance
often serves as a catalyst for heroism. After all, without wars there would be no war heroes. Yet
this does not mean that we should lionize every member of the armed forces. I find quite telling
the oft-used idiom "heroic effort," which suggests that mere coincidence has little to do with
heroism. If one examines the sorts of people we select as our heroes, it becomes evident that
heroism requires great effort, and that the very nub of heroism lies in the response, not in the
circumstance.
Consider the ordinary person who overcomes a personal obstacle through extraordinary
effort, fortitude, or faith---thereby inspiring others toward similar accomplishments. Sports
heroes often fall into this category. For example, Lance Armstrong, a Tour de France cycling
champion, became a national hero not merely because he won the race but because he
overcame a life-threatening illness, against all odds, to do so. Of course, widespread notoriety
is not a requisite for heroic status. Countless individuals with physical and mental disabilities
become heroes in their community and among their acquaintances by treating their obstacles
as personal challenges--thereby setting inspirational examples. Consider the blind law student
who inspires others to overcome the same challenge; or the amputee distance runner who
serves as a role model for other physically challenged people in her community. To assert that
individuals such as these become our heroes merely by accident, as the statement seems to
suggest, is to completely misunderstand the very stuff of which heroes are made.
Another sort of hero is the ordinary person who attains heroic stature by demonstrating
extraordinary courage of conviction--against external oppressive forces. Many such heroes
are champions of social causes, rising to heroic stature by way of the courage of their
convictions; and, it is because we share those convictions--because we recognize these
champions as being very much like us----~at they become our heroes. Such heroes as India's
Mahatma Gandhi, America's Martin Luther King, South Africa's Nelson Mandela, and Poland's
Lech Lawesa come immediately to mind. None of these heroes was born into royalty or other
privilege; they all came from fairly common, or ordinary, places and experiences. Or consider
again our military heroes, whose courage and patriotism in battie the statement would serve to
completely discredit as merely accidental outcomes of certain soldiers being "m the right place
at the right time." I think the preposterousness of such a suggestion is clear enough.
In sum, the statement correctly suggests that heroes are ordinary people like us, and that
opportunity, or circumstance, is part of what breeds heroes. However, the statement overlooks
that serendipity alone does not a hero make. Heroism requires that "heroic effort," or better yet
a "heroic response," to one's circumstances in life.
This statement is fundamentally correct; public figures should indeed expect to lose their
privacy. After all, we are a society of voyeurs wishing to transform our mundane lives; and one
way to do so is to live vicariously through the experiences of others whose lives appear more
interesting than our own. Moreover, the media recognize this societal foible and exploit it at
every opportunity. Nevertheless, a more accurate statement would draw a distinction between
political figures and other public figures; the former have even less reason than the latter to
expect to be left alone, for the reason that their duty as public servants legitimizes public
scrutiny of their private lives.
The chief reason why I generally agree with the statement is that, for better or worse,
intense media attention to the lives of public figures raises a presumption in the collective mind
of the viewing or reading public that our public figures' lives are far more interesting than our
own. This presumption is understandable. After all, I think most people would agree that given
the opportunity for even fleeting fame they would embrace it without hesitation. Peering into
the private lives of those who have achieved our dreams allows us to live vicariously through
those lives.
Another reason why I generally agree with the statement has to do with the forces that
motivate the media. For the most part, the media consist of large corporations whose chief
objective is to maximize shareholder profits. In pursuit of that objective the media are simply
giving the public what they demand a voyeuristic look into the private lives of public figures.
One need look no further than a newsstand, local-television news broadcast, or talk show to
find ample evidence that this is so. For better or worse, we love to peer at people on public
pedestals, and we love to watch them fall off. The media know this all too well, and exploit our
obsession at every opportunity.
Nevertheless, the statement should be qualified in that a political figure has less reason to
expect privacy than other public figures. Why? The private affairs of public servants become
our business when those affairs adversely affect our servants' ability to serve us effectively, or
when our servants betray our trust. For example, several years ago the chancellor of a
university located in my city was expelled from office for misusing university funds to renovate
his posh personal residence. The scandal became front-page news in the campus newspaper,
and prompted a useful system-wide reform. Also consider the Clinton sex scandal, which
sparked a debate about the powers and duties of legal prosecutors vis4-vis the chief executive.
Also, the court rulings about executive privilege and immunity, and even the impeachment
proceedings, all of which resulted from the scandal, might serve as useful legal precedents for
the future.
Admittedly, intense public scrutiny of the personal lives of public figures can carry harmful
consequences, for the public figure as well as the society. For instance, the Clinton scandal
resulted in enormous financial costs to taxpayers, and it harmed many individuals caught up in
the legal process. And for more that a year the scandal served chiefly to distract us from our
most pressing national and global problems. Yet, until as a society we come to appreciate the
potentially harmful effects of our preoccupation with the lives of public figures, they can expect
to remain the cynosures of our attention.
Issue 17
"The primary goal of technological advancement should be to increase people's efficiency so
that everyone has more leisure time."
The speaker contends that technology's primary goal should be to increase our efficiency for
the purpose of affording us more leisure time. I concede that technology has enhanced our
efficiency as we go about our everyday lives. Productivity software helps us plan and
coordinate projects; intranets, the Internet, and satellite technology make us more efficient
messengers; and technology even helps us prepare our food and access entertainment more
efficiently. Beyond this concession, however, I find the speaker's contention indefensible from
both an empirical and a normative standpoint.
The chief reason for my disagreement lies in the empirical proof: with technological
advancement comes diminished leisure time. In 1960 the average U.S. family included only
one breadwinner, who worked just over 40 hours per week. Since then the average work week
has increased steadily to nearly 60 hours today; and in most families there are now two
breadwinners. What explains this decline in leisure despite increasing efficiency that new
technologies have brought about? I contend that technology itself is the culprit behind the
decline. We use the additional free time that technology affords us not for leisure but rather for
work. As computer technology enables greater and greater office productivity it also raises our
employers' expectations--or demands--for production. Further technological advances breed
still greater efficiency and, in turn, expectations. Our spiraling work load is only exacerbated by
the competitive business environment in which nearly all of us work today. Moreover, every
technological advance demands our time and attention in order to learn how to use the new
technology. Time devoted to keeping pace with technology depletes time for leisure activities.
I disagree with the speaker for another reason as well: the suggestion that technology's
chief goal should be to facilitate leisure is simply wrongheaded. There are far more vital
concerns that technology can and should address. Advances in bio-technology can help cure
and prevent diseases; advances in medical technology can allow for safer, less invasire
diagnosis and treatment; advances in genetics can help prevent birth defects; advances in
engineering and chemistry can improve the structural integrity of our buildings, roads, bridges
and vehicles; information technology enables education while communication technology
facilitates global participation in the democratic process. In short, health, safety, education, and
freedom--and not leisure--are the proper final objectives of technology. Admittedly, advances
in these areas sometimes involve improved efficiency; yet efficiency is merely a means to
these more important ends.
In sum, I find indefensible the speaker's suggestion that technology's value lies chiefly in the
efficiency and resulting leisure time it can afford us. The suggestion runs contrary to the
overwhelming evidence that technology diminishes leisure time, and it wrongly places leisure
ahead of goals such as health, safety, education, and freedom as technology's ultimate aims.
Issue 18
"Money spent on research is almost always a good investment, even when the results of that
research are controversial."
I agree with the speaker's broad assertion that money spent on research is generally money
well invested. However, the speaker unnecessarily extends this broad assertion to embrace
research whose results are "controversial," while ignoring certain compelling reasons why
some types of research might be unjustifiable. My points of contention with the speaker
involves the fundamental objectives and nature of research, as discussed below.
I concede that the speaker is on the correct philosophical side of this issue. After all,
research is the exploration of the unknown for true answers to our questions, and for lasting
solutions to our enduring problems. Research is also the chief means by which we humans
attempt to satisfy our insatiable appetite for knowledge, and our craving to understand
ourselves and the world around us. Yet, in the very notion of research also lies my first point of
contention with the speaker, who illogically presumes that we can know the results of research
before we invest in it. To the contrary, if research is to be of any value it must explore
uncharted and unpredictable territory. In fact, query whether research whose benefits are
immediate and predictable can break any new ground, or whether it can be considered
"research" at all.
While we must invest in research irrespective of whether the results might be controversial,
at the same time we should be circumspect about research whose objectives are too vague
and whose potential benefits are too speculative. After all, expensive research always carries
significant opportunity costs--in terms of how the money might be spent toward addressing
society's more immediate problems that do not require research. One apt illustration of this
point involves the so-called "Star Wars" defense initiative, championed by the Reagan
administration during the 1980s. In retrospect, this initiative was ill-conceived and largely a
waste of taxpayer dollars; and few would dispute that the exorbitant amount of money devoted
to the initiative could have gone a long way toward addressing pressing social problems of the
day--by establishing after-school programs for delinquent latchkey kids, by enhancing AIDS
awareness and education, and so forth. As it turns out, at the end of the Star Wars debacle we
were left with rampant gang violence, an AIDS epidemic, and an unprecedented federal
budget deficit.
The speaker's assertion is troubling in two other r~sp,ects as well. First, no amount of
research can completely solve the enduring pr~l~rm of war, poverty, and violence, for the
reason that they stem from certain aspects of human nature--such as aggression and greed.
Although human genome research might eventually enable us to engineer away those
undesirable aspects of our nature, in the meantime it is up to our economists, diplomats, social
reformers, and jurists--not our research laboratories--to mitigate these problems. Secondly, for
every new research breakthrough that helps reduce human suffering is another that serves
primarily to add to that suffering. For example, while some might argue that physics
researchers who harnessed the power of the atom have provided us with an alternative source
of energy and invaluable "peace-keepers," this argument flies in the face of the hundreds of
thousands of innocent people murdered and maimed by atomic blasts, and by nuclear
meltdowns. And, in fulfilling the promise of "better living through chemistry" research has given
us chemical weapons for human slaughter. In short, so-called "advances" that scientific
research has brought about often amount to net losses for humanity.
In sum, the speaker's assertion that we should invest in research whose results are
"controversial" begs the question, because we cannot know whether research will turn out
controversial until we've invested in it. As for the speaker's broader assertion, I agree that
money spent on research is generally a sound investment because it is an investment in the
advancement of human knowledge and in human imagination and spirit. Nevertheless, when
we do research purely for its own sake without aim or clear purpose--we risk squandering
resources which could have been applied to relieve the immediate suffering of our dispirited,
disadvantaged, and disenfranchised members of society. In the final analysis, given finite
economic resources we are forced to strike a balance in how we allocate those resources
among competing societal objectives.
Issue 19
"Creating an appealing image has become more important in contemporary society than is the
reality or truth behind that image."
Has creating an image become more important in our society than the reality or truth behind
the image? I agree that image has become a more central concern, at least where short-term
business or political success is at stake. Nevertheless, I think that in the longer term image
ultimately yields to substance and fact.
The important role of image is particularly evident in the business world. Consider, for
example, today's automobile industry. American cars are becoming essentially identical to
competing Japanese cars in nearly every mechanical and structural respect, as well as in price.
Thus to compete effectively auto companies must now differentiate their products largely
through image advertising, by conjuring up certain illusory benefits--such as machismo, status,
sensibility, or fun. The increasing focus on image is also evident in the book-publishing
business. Publishers are relying more and more on the power of their brands rather than the
content of their books. Today mass-market books are supplanted within a year with products
that are essential the same---except with fresh faces, rifles, and other promotional angles. I
find quite telling the fact that today more and more book publishers are being acquired by large
media companies. And the increasing importance of image is especially evident in the music
industry, where originality, artistic interpretation, and technical proficiency have yielded almost
entirely to sex appeal.
The growing significance of image is also evident in the political realm, particularly when it
comes to presidential politics. Admittedly, by its very nature politicking has always emphasized
rhetoric and appearances above substance and fact. Yet since the invention of the camera
presidential politicians have become increasingly concerned about their image. For example,
Teddy Roosevelt was very careful never to be photographed wearing a tennis outfit, for fear
that such photographs would serve to undermine his rough-rider image that won him his only
term in office. With the advent of television, image became even more central in presidential
politics. After all, it was television that elected J.F.K. over Nixon. And our only two-term
presidents in the television age were elected based largely on their image. Query whether
Presidents Lincoln, Taft, or even F.D.R. would be elected today if pitted against the handsome
leading man Reagan, or the suave and poliricaUy correct Clinton. After all, Lincoln was homely,
Taft was obese, and F.D.R. was crippled.
In the long term, however, the significance of image wanes considerably. The image of the
Marlboro man ultimately gave way to the truth about the health hazards of cigarette smoking.
Popular musical acts with nothing truly innovative to offer musically eventually disappear from
the music scene. And anyone who frequents yard sales knows that today's best-selling books
often become tomorrow's pulp. Even in politics, I think history has a knack for peeling away
image to focus on real accomplishments. I think history will remember Teddy Roosevelt, for
example, primarily for building the Panama Canal and for establishing our National Park
System--and not for his rough-and-ready wardrobe.
In the final analysis, it seems that in every endeavor where success depends to some
degree on persuasion, marketing, or salesmanship, image has indeed become the central
concern of those who seek to persuade. And as our lives become busier, our attention spans
briefer, and our choices among products and services greater, I expect this trend to continue
unabated--for better or worse.
Issue 20
"Most of the people we consider heroic today were, in fact, very ordinary people who
happened to be in the right place at the right time."
I agree with the statement insofar as our heroes tend to be ordinary people like us. However,
I strongly disagree with the further assertion that people become heroes simply by being "in
the right place at the right time." If we look around at the sorts of people we choose as our
heroes, we real/ze that heroism has far less to do with circumstance than with how a hero
responds to it.
I concede that heroes are generally ordinary people. In my observation we choose as our
heroes people with whom we strongly identify--people who are very much like us. In fact many
of us call a parent, grandparent, or older sibling our hero. Why? My intuition is that the more a
person shares in common with us----m terms of experience, heritage, disposition, motives, and
even physical attributes-----~e more accessible that person's heroic traits are to us, and the
stronger their attraction as a role model. And few would dispute that we share more in common
with immediately family than with anyone else.
However, the statement's further suggestion that people become heroes merely as a result
of circumstances not of their own choosing is simply wrongheaded. Admittedly, circumstance
often serves as a catalyst for heroism. After all, without wars there would be no war heroes. Yet
this does not mean that we should lionize every member of the armed forces. I find quite telling
the oft-used idiom "heroic effort," which suggests that mere coincidence has little to do with
heroism. If one examines the sorts of people we select as our heroes, it becomes evident that
heroism requires great effort, and that the very nub of heroism lies in the response, not in the
circumstance.
Consider the ordinary person who overcomes a personal obstacle through extraordinary
effort, fortitude, or faith---thereby inspiring others toward similar accomplishments. Sports
heroes often fall into this category. For example, Lance Armstrong, a Tour de France cycling
champion, became a national hero not merely because he won the race but because he
overcame a life-threatening illness, against all odds, to do so. Of course, widespread notoriety
is not a requisite for heroic status. Countless individuals with physical and mental disabilities
become heroes in their community and among their acquaintances by treating their obstacles
as personal challenges--thereby setting inspirational examples. Consider the blind law student
who inspires others to overcome the same challenge; or the amputee distance runner who
serves as a role model for other physically challenged people in her community. To assert that
individuals such as these become our heroes merely by accident, as the statement seems to
suggest, is to completely misunderstand the very stuff of which heroes are made.
Another sort of hero is the ordinary person who attains heroic stature by demonstrating
extraordinary courage of conviction--against external oppressive forces. Many such heroes
are champions of social causes, rising to heroic stature by way of the courage of their
convictions; and, it is because we share those convictions--because we recognize these
champions as being very much like us----~at they become our heroes. Such heroes as India's
Mahatma Gandhi, America's Martin Luther King, South Africa's Nelson Mandela, and Poland's
Lech Lawesa come immediately to mind. None of these heroes was born into royalty or other
privilege; they all came from fairly common, or ordinary, places and experiences. Or consider
again our military heroes, whose courage and patriotism in battie the statement would serve to
completely discredit as merely accidental outcomes of certain soldiers being "m the right place
at the right time." I think the preposterousness of such a suggestion is clear enough.
In sum, the statement correctly suggests that heroes are ordinary people like us, and that
opportunity, or circumstance, is part of what breeds heroes. However, the statement overlooks
that serendipity alone does not a hero make. Heroism requires that "heroic effort," or better yet
a "heroic response," to one's circumstances in life.
the luxuries and conveniences of contemporary life
Issue 9
"Although many people think that the luxuries and conveniences of contemporary life are entirely harmless, they in fact, prevent people from developing into truly strong and independent individuals."
Do modern luxuries serve to undermine our true strength and independence as individuals?
The speaker believes so, and I tend to agree. Consider the automobile, for example. Most
people consider the automobile a necessity rather than a luxury; yet it is for this very reason
that the automobile so aptly supports the speaker's point. To the extent that we depend on cars
as crutches, they prevent us from becoming truly independent and strong in character as
individuals.
Consider first the effect of the automobile on our independence as individuals. In some
respects the automobile serves to enhance such independence. For example, cars make it
possible for people in isolated and depressed areas without public transportation to become
more independent by pursing gainful employment outside their communities. And teenagers
discover that owning a car, or even borrowing one on occasion, affords them a needed sense
of independence from their parents.
However, cars have diminished our independence in a number of more significant respects.
We've grown dependent on our cars for commuting to work. We rely on them like crutches for
short trips to the corner store, and for carting our children to and from school. Moreover, the
car has become a means not only to our assorted physical destinations but also to the
attainment of our socioeconomic goals, insofar as the automobile has become a symbol of
status. In fact, in my observation many, if not most, working professionals willingly undermine
their financial security for the sake of being seen driving this year's new SUV or luxury sedan.
In short, we've become slaves to the automobile.
Consider next the overall impact of the automobile on our strength as individuals, by which I
mean strength of character, or mettle. I would be hard-pressed to list one way in which the
automobile enhances one's strength of character. Driving a powerful SUV might afford a
person a feeling and appearance of strength, or machismo. But this feeling has nothing to do
with a person's true character.
In contrast, there is a certain strength of character that comes with eschewing modern
conveniences such as cars, and with the knowledge that one is contributing to a cleaner and
quieter environment, a safer neighborhood, and arguably a more genteel society. Also,
alternative modes of transportation such as bicycling and walking are forms of exercise which
require and promote the virtue of self-discipline. Finally, in my observation people who have
forsaken the automobile spend more time at home, where they are more inclined to prepare
and even grow their own food, and to spend more time with their families. The former
enhances one's independence; the latter enhances the integrity of one's values and the
strength of one's family.
To sum up, the automobile helps illustrate that when a luxury becomes a necessity it can sap
our independence and strength as individuals. Perhaps our society is better off, on balance,
with such "luxuries"; after all, the automobile industry has created countless jobs, raised our
standard of living, and made the world more interesting. However, by becoming slaves to the
automobile we trade off a certain independence and inner strength.
Issue 10
"Most cultures encourage individuals to sacrifice a large part of their own personalities in order
to be like other people. Thus, most people are afraid to think or behave differently because
they do not want to be excluded."
The speaker claims that most cultures encourage conformity at the expense of individuality,
and as a result most people conform for fear of being excluded. While I find the second prong
of this dual claim well supported overall by empirical evidence, I take exception with the first
prong; aside from the cultures created by certain oppressive political regimes, no culture need
"encourage" its members to conform to prevailing ways of thought and behavior; in fact, all the
evidence shows that cultures attempt to do just the opposite.
As a threshold matter, it is necessary to distinguish between conformity that an oppressive
ruling state imposes on its own culture and conformity in a free democratic society. In the
former case, people are not only encouraged but actually coerced into suppressing individual
personality; and indeed these people are afraid to think and behave differently--but not for fear
of being excluded but rather for fear of punishment and persecution by the state. The modern
Communist and Fascist regimes are fitting examples. With respect to free democratic societies,
it might be tempting to dismiss the speaker's dual claim out of hand. After all, true democratic
states are predicated on individual freedoms---of choice, speech, expression, religion, and so
forth. Ostensibly, these freedoms serve to promote individuality, even non-conformity, in our
personas, our lifestyles, and our opinions and attitudes.
Yet, one look at any democratic society reveals a high degree of conformity among its
members. Every society has its own bundle of values, customs, and mores which most of its
members share. Admittedly, within any culture springs up various subcultures which try to
distinguish themselves by their own distinct values, customs, and mores. In the U.S., for
instance, African-Americans have developed a distinct dialect, known as Ebonics, and a
distinct body language and attitude which affords them a strong sub-cultural identity of their
own. Yet, the undeniable fact is that humans, given the actual freedom to either conform or not
conform, choose to think and behave in ways similar to most people in their social
group---however we define that group.
Nor is there much empirical evidence of any cultural agenda, either overt or covert, to
encourage conformity in thought and behavior among the members of any culture. To the
contrary, the predominant message in most cultures is that people should cultivate their
individuality. Consider, for example, the enduring and nearly ubiquitous icon of the ragged
individualist, who charts his or her own course, bucks the trend, and achieves notoriety
through individual creativity, imagination, invention, or entrepreneurship. Even our systems of
higher education seem to encourage individualism by promoting and cultivating critical and
independent thought among its students.
Yet, all the support for forging one's one unique persona, career, lifestyle, opinions, and
even belief system, turns out to be hype. In the final analysis, most people choose to conform.
And understandably so; after all, it is human nature to distrust, and even shun, others who are
too different from us. Thus to embrace rugged individualism is to risk becoming an outcast, the
natural consequence of which is to lLmit one's socioeconomic and career opportunities. This
prospect suffices to quell our yearning to be different; thus the speaker is correct that most of
us resign ourselves to conformity for fear of being left behind by our peers. Admittedly, few
cultures are without rugged individualists----the exceptional artists, inventors, explorers, social
reformers, and entrepreneurs who embrace their autonomy of thought and behavior, then test
their limits. And paradoxically, it is the achievements of these notable non-conformists that are
responsible for most cultural evolution and progress. Yet such notables are few and far
between in what is otherwise a world of insecure, even fearful, cultural conformists.
To sum up, the speaker is correct that most people choose to conform rather than behave
and think in ways that run contrary to their culture's norms, and that fear of being exduded lies
at the heart of this choice. Yet, no culture need encourage conformity; most humans recognize
that there is safety of numbers, and as a result freely choose conformity over the risks, and
potential rewards, of non-conformity.
Issue 11
"There are two types of laws: just and unjust. Every individual in a society has a responsibility
to obey just laws and, even more importantly, to disobey and resist unjust laws."
According to this statement, each person has a duty to not only obey just laws but also disobey
unjust ones. In my view this statement is too extreme, in two respects. First, it wrongly
categorizes any law as either just or unjust; and secondly, it recommends an ineffective and
potentially harmful means of legal reform.
First, whether a law is just or unjust is rarely a straightforward issue. The fairness of any law
depends on one's personal value system. This is especially true when it comes to personal
freedoms. Consider, for example, the controversial issue of abortion. Individuals with particular
religious beliefs tend to view laws allowing mothers an abortion choice as unjust, while
individuals with other value systems might view such laws as just.
The fairness of a law also depends on one's personal interest, or stake, in the legal issue at
hand. After all, in a democratic society the chief function of laws is to strike a balance among
competing interests. Consider, for example, a law that regulates the toxic effluents a certain
factory can emit into a nearby river. Such laws are designed chiefly to protect public health. But
complying with the regulation might be costly for the company; the factory might be forced to
lay off employees or shut down altogether, or increase the price of its products to compensate
for the cost of compliance. At stake are the respective interests of the company's owners,
employees, and customers, as well as the opposing interests of the region's residents whose
health and safety are impacted. In short, the fairness of the law is subjective, depending
largely on how one's personal interests are affected by it.
The second fundamental problem with the statement is that disobeying unjust laws often has
the opposite affect of what was intended or hoped for. Most anyone would argue, for instance,
that our federal system of income taxation is unfair in one respect or another. Yet the end result
of widespread disobedience, in this case tax evasion, is to perpetuate the system. Free-riders
only compel the government to maintain tax rates at high levels in order to ensure adequate
revenue for the various programs in its budget.
Yet another fundamental problem with the statement is that by justifying a violation of one
sort of law we find ourselves on a slippery slope toward sanctioning all types of illegal behavior,
including egregious criminal conduct. Returning to the abortion example mentioned above, a
person strongly opposed to the freedom-of-choice position might maintain that the illegal
blocking of access to an abortion clinic amounts to justifiable disobedience. However, it is a
precariously short leap from this sort of civil disobedience to physical confrontations with clinic
workers, then to the infliction of property damage, then to the bombing of the clinic and
potential murder.
In sum, because the inherent function of our laws is to balance competing interests,
reasonable people with different priorities will always disagree about the fairness of specific
laws. Accordingly, radical action such as resistance or disobedience is rarely justified merely
by one's subjective viewpoint or personal interests. And in any event, disobedience is never
justifiable when the legal rights or safety of innocent people are jeopardized as a result.
Issue 12
"Anyone can make things bigger and more complex. What requires real effort and courage is
to move in the opposite direction---in other words, to make things as simple as possible."
Whether making things simple requires greater effort and courage than making them bigger
and more complex depends on the sort of effort and courage. Indisputably, the many complex
technological marvels that are part-and-parcel of our Lives today are the result of the
extraordinary cumulative efforts of our engineers, entrepreneurs, and others. And, such
achievements always call for the courage to risk failing in a large way. Yet, humans seem
naturally driven to make things bigger and more complex; thus refraining from doing so, or
reversing this natural process, takes considerable effort and courage of a different sort, as
discussed below.
The statement brings immediately to mind the ever-growing and increasingly complex digital
world. Today's high-tech firms seem compelled to boldly go to whatever effort is required to
devise increasingly complex products, for the ostensible purpose of staying ahead of their
competitors. Yet, the sort of effort and courage to which the statement refers is a different
one--bred of vision, imagination, and a willingness to forego near term profits for the prospect
of making lasting contributions. Surely, a number of entrepreneurs and engineers today are
mustering that courage, and are making the effort to create far simpler, yet more elegant,
technologies and applications, which will truly make our lives simpler in sharp contrast to
what computer technology has delivered to us so far.
Lending even more credence to the statement is the so-called "big government"
phenomenon. Human societies have a natural tendency to create unwieldy bureaucracies, a
fitting example of which is the U.S. tax-law system. The Intemal Revenue Code and its
accompanying Treasury Regulations have grown so voluminous and complex that many
certified accountants and tax attorneys admit that they cannot begin to understand it all.
Admittedly, this system has grown only through considerable effort on the part of all three
branches of the federal government, not to mention the efforts of many special interest groups.
Yet, therein lies the statement's credibility. It requires great effort and courage on the part of a
legislator to risk alienating special interest groups, thereby risking reelection prospects, by
standing on principle for a simpler tax system that is less costly to administer and better serves
the interests of most taxpayers.
Adding further credibility to the statement is the tendency of most people to complicate their
personal lives--a tendency that seems especially strong in today's age of technology and
consumerism. The greater our mobility, the greater our number of destinations each day; the
more time-saving gadgets we use, the more activities we try to pack into our day; and with
readier access to information we try to assimilate more of it each day. I am hard-pressed to
think of one person who has ever exclaimed to me how much effort and courage it has taken to
complicate his or her life in these respects. In contrast, a certain self-restraint and courage of
conviction are both required to eschew modern conveniences, to simplify one'sdaily schedule,
and to establish and adhere to a simple plan for the use of one's time and money.
In sum, whether we are building computer networks, government agencies, or personal
lifestyles, great effort and courage are required to make things simple, or to keep them that
way. Moreover, because humans na~traUy tend to make things big and complex, it arguably
requires more effort and courage to move in the opposite direction. In the final analysis,
making things simple---or keeping them that way--takes a brand of effort born of reflection and
restraint rather than sheer exertion, and a courage character and conviction rather than
unbridled ambition.
Issue 13
"Most people would agree that buildings represent a valuable record of any society's past, but
controversy arises when old buildings stand on ground that modern planners feel could be
better used for modern purposes. In such situations, modern development should be given
precedence over the preservation of historic buildings so that contemporary needs can be
served."
The speaker asserts that wherever a practical, utilitarian need for new buildings arises this
need should take precedence over our conflicting interest in preserving historic buildings as a
record of our past. In my view, however, which interest should take precedence should be
determined on a case-by-case basis--and should account not only for practical and historic
considerations but also aesthetic ones.
In determining whether to raze an older building, planners should of course consider the
community's current and anticipated utilitarian needs. For example, if an additional hospital is
needed to adequately serve the health-care needs of a fast-growing community, this
compelling interest might very well outweigh any interest in preserving a historic building that
sits on the proposed site. Or if additional parking is needed to ensure the economic survival of
a city's downtown district, this interest might take precedence over the historic value of an old
structure that stands in the way of a parking structure. On the other hand, if the need is mainly
for more office space, in some cases an architecturally appropriate add-on or annex to an
older building might serve just as well as razing the old building to make way for a new one. Of
course, an expensive retrofit might not be worthwhile if no amount of retrofitting would meet
the need.
Competing with a community's utilitarian needs is an interest preserving the historical record.
Again, the weight of this interest should be determined on a case-by-case basis. Perhaps an
older building uniquely represents a bygone era, or once played a central role in the city's
history as a municipal structure. Or perhaps the building once served as the home of a
founding family or other significant historical figure, or as the location of an important historical
event. Any of these scenarios might justify saving the building at the expense of the practical
needs of the community. On the other hand, if several older buildings represent the same
historical era just as effectively, or if the building's history is an unremarkable one, then the
historic value of the building might pale in comparison to the value of a new structure that
meets a compelling practical need.
Also competing with a community's utilitarian needs is the aesthetic and architectural value
of the building itself--apart from historical events with which it might be associated. A building
might be one of only a few that represents a certain architectural style. Or it might be especially
beautiful, perhaps as a result of the craftsmanship and materials employed in its
construction--which might be cost-prohibitive to replicate today. Even retrofitting the building to
accommodate current needs might undermine its aesthetic as well as historic value, by
altering its appearance and architectural integrity. Of course it is difficult to quantify aesthetic
value and weigh it against utilitarian considerations. Yet planners should strive to account for
aesthetic value nonetheless.
In sum, whether to raze an older building in order to construct a new one should never be
determined indiscriminately. Instead, planners should make such decisions on a case-by-case
basis, weighing the community's practical needs against the building's historic and aesthetic
value.
Issue 14
"Students should memorize facts only after they have studied the ideas, trends, and concepts
that help explain those facts. Students who have learned only facts have learned very little."
The speaker makes a threshold claim that students who learn only facts learn very little, then
condudes that students should always learn about concepts, ideas, and trends before they
memorize facts. While I wholeheartedly agree with the threshold claim, the condusion unfairly
generalizes about the learning process. In fact, following the speaker's advice would actually
impede the learning of concepts and ideas, as well as impeding the development of insightful
and useful new ones.
Turning first to the speaker's threshold daim, I strongly agree that ifwe learn only facts we
learn very little. Consider the task of memorizing the periodic table of dements, which any
student can memorize without any knowledge of chemistry, or that the table relates to
chemistry. Rote memorization of the table amounts to a bit of mental exercise-an opportunity to
practice memorization techniques and perhaps learn some new ones. Otherwise, the student
has learned very little about chemical dements, or about anything for that matter.
As for the speaker's ultimate claim, I concede that postponing the memorization of facts until
after one leams ideas and concepts holds certain advantages. With a conceptual framework
already in place a student is better able to understand the meaning of a fact, and to appreciate
its significance. As a result, the student is more likely to memorize the fact to begin with, and
less likely to forget it as time passes. Moreover, in my observation students whose first goal is
to memorize facts tend to stop there--for whatever reason. It seems that by focusing on facts
first students risk equating the learning process with the assimilation of trivia; in turn, students
risk learning nothing of much use in solving real world problems.
Conceding that students must learn ideas and concepts, as well as facts relating to them, in
order to learning anything meaningful, I nevertheless disagree that the former should always
precede the latter--for three reasons. In the first place, I see know reason why memorizing a
fact cannot precede learning about its meaning and significance--as long as the student does
not stop at rote memorization. Consider once again our hypothetical chemistry student. The
speaker might advise this student to first learn about the historical trends leading to the
discovery of the elements, or to learn about the concepts of altering chemical compounds to
achieve certain reactions--before studying the periodic table. Having no familiarity with the
basic vocabulary of chemistry, which includes the informarion in the periodic table, this student
would come away from the first two lessons bewildered and confused in other words, having
learned little.
In the second place, the speaker misunderstands the process by which we learn ideas and
concepts, and by which we develop new ones. Consider, for example, how economics
students learn about the relationship between supply and demand, and the resulting concept
of market equilibrium, and of surplus and shortage. Learning about the dynamics of supply and
demand involves (1) entertaining a theory, and perhaps even formulating a new one, (2)
testing hypothetical scenarios against the theory, and (3) examining real-world facts for the
purpose of confirming, refuting, modifying, or qualifying the theory. But which step should
come first? The speaker would have us follow steps 1 through 3 in that order. Yet, theories,
concepts, and ideas rarely materialize out of thin air; they generally emerge from empirical
observations--i.e., facts. Thus the speaker's notion about how we should learn concepts and
ideas gets the learning process backwards.
In the third place, strict adherence to the speaker's advice would surely lead to illconceived
ideas, concepts, and theories. Why? An idea or concept conjured up without the benefit of data
amounts to little more than the conjurer's hopes and desires. Accordingly, conjurers will tend to
seek out facts that support their prejudices and opinions, and overlook or avoid facts that
refute them. One telling example involves theories about the center of the universe.
Understandably, we ego-driven humans would prefer that the universe revolve around us.
Early theories presumed so for this reason, and facts that ran contrary to this ego-driven
theory were ignored, while observers of these facts were scorned and even vilified. In short,
students who strictly follow the speaker's prescription are unlikely to contribute significantly to
the advancement of knowledge.
To sum up, in a vacuum facts are meaningless, and only by filling that vacuum with ideas
and concepts can students learn, by gaining useful perspectives and insights about facts. Yet,
since facts are the very stuff from which ideas, concepts, and trends spring, without some facts
students cannot learn much of anything. In the final analysis, then, students should learn facts
right along with concepts, ideas, and trends.
Issue 15
"Unfortunately, the media tend to highlight what is sensational at the moment. Society would
be better served if the media reported or focused more fully on events and trends that will
ultimately have the most long-term significance."
The speaker asserts that rather than merely highlighting certain sensational events the
media should provide complete coverage of more important events. While the speaker's
assertion has merit from a normative standpoint, in the final analysis I find this assertion
indefensible.
Upon first impression the speaker's claim seems quite compelling, for two reasons. First,
without the benefit of a complete, unfiltered, and balanced account of current events, it is
impossible to develop an informed and intelligent opinion about important social and political
issues and, in turn, to contribute meaningfully to our democratic society, which relies on broad
participation in an ongoing debate about such issues to steer a proper course. The end result
of our being a largely uninformed people is that we relegate the most important decisions to a
handful of legislators, jurists, and executives who may or may not know what is best for us.
Second, by focusing on the "sensational"--by which I take the speaker to mean
comparatively shocking, entertaining, and titillating events which easily catch one's
attention-the media appeal to our emotions and baser instincts, rather than to our intellect and
reason. Any observant person could list many examples aptly illustrating the trend in this
direction--from trashy talk shows and local news broadcasts to The National Enquixer and
People Magazine. This trend dearly serves to undermine a society's collective sensibilities and
renders a society's members more vulnerable to demagoguery; thus we should all abhor and
resist the trend.
However, for several reasons I find the media's current trend toward highlights and the
sensational to be justifiable. First, the world is becoming an increasingly eventful place; thus
with each passing year it becomes a more onerous task for the media to attempt full news
coverage. Second, we are becoming an increasingly busy society. The average U.S. worker
spends nearly 60 hours per week at work now; and in most families both spouses work.
Compare this startlingly busy pace to the pace a generation ago, when one bread-winner
worked just over 40 hours per week. We have far less time today for news, so highlights must
suffice. Third, the media does in fact provide full coverage of important events; anyone can find
such coverage beyond their newspaper's front page, on daily PBS news programs, and on the
Internet. I would wholeheartedly agree with the speaker if the sensational highlights were all
the media were willing or permitted to provide; this scenario would be tantamount to thought
control on a mass scale and would serve to undermine our free society. However, I am aware
of no evidence of any trend in this direction. To the contrary, in my observation the media are
informing us more fully than ever before; we just need to seek out that information.
On balance, then, the speaker's claim is not defensible. In the final analysis the media
serves its proper function by merely providing what we in a free society demand. Thus any
argument about how the media should or should not behave--regardless of its merits from a
normative standpoint begs the question.
"Although many people think that the luxuries and conveniences of contemporary life are entirely harmless, they in fact, prevent people from developing into truly strong and independent individuals."
Do modern luxuries serve to undermine our true strength and independence as individuals?
The speaker believes so, and I tend to agree. Consider the automobile, for example. Most
people consider the automobile a necessity rather than a luxury; yet it is for this very reason
that the automobile so aptly supports the speaker's point. To the extent that we depend on cars
as crutches, they prevent us from becoming truly independent and strong in character as
individuals.
Consider first the effect of the automobile on our independence as individuals. In some
respects the automobile serves to enhance such independence. For example, cars make it
possible for people in isolated and depressed areas without public transportation to become
more independent by pursing gainful employment outside their communities. And teenagers
discover that owning a car, or even borrowing one on occasion, affords them a needed sense
of independence from their parents.
However, cars have diminished our independence in a number of more significant respects.
We've grown dependent on our cars for commuting to work. We rely on them like crutches for
short trips to the corner store, and for carting our children to and from school. Moreover, the
car has become a means not only to our assorted physical destinations but also to the
attainment of our socioeconomic goals, insofar as the automobile has become a symbol of
status. In fact, in my observation many, if not most, working professionals willingly undermine
their financial security for the sake of being seen driving this year's new SUV or luxury sedan.
In short, we've become slaves to the automobile.
Consider next the overall impact of the automobile on our strength as individuals, by which I
mean strength of character, or mettle. I would be hard-pressed to list one way in which the
automobile enhances one's strength of character. Driving a powerful SUV might afford a
person a feeling and appearance of strength, or machismo. But this feeling has nothing to do
with a person's true character.
In contrast, there is a certain strength of character that comes with eschewing modern
conveniences such as cars, and with the knowledge that one is contributing to a cleaner and
quieter environment, a safer neighborhood, and arguably a more genteel society. Also,
alternative modes of transportation such as bicycling and walking are forms of exercise which
require and promote the virtue of self-discipline. Finally, in my observation people who have
forsaken the automobile spend more time at home, where they are more inclined to prepare
and even grow their own food, and to spend more time with their families. The former
enhances one's independence; the latter enhances the integrity of one's values and the
strength of one's family.
To sum up, the automobile helps illustrate that when a luxury becomes a necessity it can sap
our independence and strength as individuals. Perhaps our society is better off, on balance,
with such "luxuries"; after all, the automobile industry has created countless jobs, raised our
standard of living, and made the world more interesting. However, by becoming slaves to the
automobile we trade off a certain independence and inner strength.
Issue 10
"Most cultures encourage individuals to sacrifice a large part of their own personalities in order
to be like other people. Thus, most people are afraid to think or behave differently because
they do not want to be excluded."
The speaker claims that most cultures encourage conformity at the expense of individuality,
and as a result most people conform for fear of being excluded. While I find the second prong
of this dual claim well supported overall by empirical evidence, I take exception with the first
prong; aside from the cultures created by certain oppressive political regimes, no culture need
"encourage" its members to conform to prevailing ways of thought and behavior; in fact, all the
evidence shows that cultures attempt to do just the opposite.
As a threshold matter, it is necessary to distinguish between conformity that an oppressive
ruling state imposes on its own culture and conformity in a free democratic society. In the
former case, people are not only encouraged but actually coerced into suppressing individual
personality; and indeed these people are afraid to think and behave differently--but not for fear
of being excluded but rather for fear of punishment and persecution by the state. The modern
Communist and Fascist regimes are fitting examples. With respect to free democratic societies,
it might be tempting to dismiss the speaker's dual claim out of hand. After all, true democratic
states are predicated on individual freedoms---of choice, speech, expression, religion, and so
forth. Ostensibly, these freedoms serve to promote individuality, even non-conformity, in our
personas, our lifestyles, and our opinions and attitudes.
Yet, one look at any democratic society reveals a high degree of conformity among its
members. Every society has its own bundle of values, customs, and mores which most of its
members share. Admittedly, within any culture springs up various subcultures which try to
distinguish themselves by their own distinct values, customs, and mores. In the U.S., for
instance, African-Americans have developed a distinct dialect, known as Ebonics, and a
distinct body language and attitude which affords them a strong sub-cultural identity of their
own. Yet, the undeniable fact is that humans, given the actual freedom to either conform or not
conform, choose to think and behave in ways similar to most people in their social
group---however we define that group.
Nor is there much empirical evidence of any cultural agenda, either overt or covert, to
encourage conformity in thought and behavior among the members of any culture. To the
contrary, the predominant message in most cultures is that people should cultivate their
individuality. Consider, for example, the enduring and nearly ubiquitous icon of the ragged
individualist, who charts his or her own course, bucks the trend, and achieves notoriety
through individual creativity, imagination, invention, or entrepreneurship. Even our systems of
higher education seem to encourage individualism by promoting and cultivating critical and
independent thought among its students.
Yet, all the support for forging one's one unique persona, career, lifestyle, opinions, and
even belief system, turns out to be hype. In the final analysis, most people choose to conform.
And understandably so; after all, it is human nature to distrust, and even shun, others who are
too different from us. Thus to embrace rugged individualism is to risk becoming an outcast, the
natural consequence of which is to lLmit one's socioeconomic and career opportunities. This
prospect suffices to quell our yearning to be different; thus the speaker is correct that most of
us resign ourselves to conformity for fear of being left behind by our peers. Admittedly, few
cultures are without rugged individualists----the exceptional artists, inventors, explorers, social
reformers, and entrepreneurs who embrace their autonomy of thought and behavior, then test
their limits. And paradoxically, it is the achievements of these notable non-conformists that are
responsible for most cultural evolution and progress. Yet such notables are few and far
between in what is otherwise a world of insecure, even fearful, cultural conformists.
To sum up, the speaker is correct that most people choose to conform rather than behave
and think in ways that run contrary to their culture's norms, and that fear of being exduded lies
at the heart of this choice. Yet, no culture need encourage conformity; most humans recognize
that there is safety of numbers, and as a result freely choose conformity over the risks, and
potential rewards, of non-conformity.
Issue 11
"There are two types of laws: just and unjust. Every individual in a society has a responsibility
to obey just laws and, even more importantly, to disobey and resist unjust laws."
According to this statement, each person has a duty to not only obey just laws but also disobey
unjust ones. In my view this statement is too extreme, in two respects. First, it wrongly
categorizes any law as either just or unjust; and secondly, it recommends an ineffective and
potentially harmful means of legal reform.
First, whether a law is just or unjust is rarely a straightforward issue. The fairness of any law
depends on one's personal value system. This is especially true when it comes to personal
freedoms. Consider, for example, the controversial issue of abortion. Individuals with particular
religious beliefs tend to view laws allowing mothers an abortion choice as unjust, while
individuals with other value systems might view such laws as just.
The fairness of a law also depends on one's personal interest, or stake, in the legal issue at
hand. After all, in a democratic society the chief function of laws is to strike a balance among
competing interests. Consider, for example, a law that regulates the toxic effluents a certain
factory can emit into a nearby river. Such laws are designed chiefly to protect public health. But
complying with the regulation might be costly for the company; the factory might be forced to
lay off employees or shut down altogether, or increase the price of its products to compensate
for the cost of compliance. At stake are the respective interests of the company's owners,
employees, and customers, as well as the opposing interests of the region's residents whose
health and safety are impacted. In short, the fairness of the law is subjective, depending
largely on how one's personal interests are affected by it.
The second fundamental problem with the statement is that disobeying unjust laws often has
the opposite affect of what was intended or hoped for. Most anyone would argue, for instance,
that our federal system of income taxation is unfair in one respect or another. Yet the end result
of widespread disobedience, in this case tax evasion, is to perpetuate the system. Free-riders
only compel the government to maintain tax rates at high levels in order to ensure adequate
revenue for the various programs in its budget.
Yet another fundamental problem with the statement is that by justifying a violation of one
sort of law we find ourselves on a slippery slope toward sanctioning all types of illegal behavior,
including egregious criminal conduct. Returning to the abortion example mentioned above, a
person strongly opposed to the freedom-of-choice position might maintain that the illegal
blocking of access to an abortion clinic amounts to justifiable disobedience. However, it is a
precariously short leap from this sort of civil disobedience to physical confrontations with clinic
workers, then to the infliction of property damage, then to the bombing of the clinic and
potential murder.
In sum, because the inherent function of our laws is to balance competing interests,
reasonable people with different priorities will always disagree about the fairness of specific
laws. Accordingly, radical action such as resistance or disobedience is rarely justified merely
by one's subjective viewpoint or personal interests. And in any event, disobedience is never
justifiable when the legal rights or safety of innocent people are jeopardized as a result.
Issue 12
"Anyone can make things bigger and more complex. What requires real effort and courage is
to move in the opposite direction---in other words, to make things as simple as possible."
Whether making things simple requires greater effort and courage than making them bigger
and more complex depends on the sort of effort and courage. Indisputably, the many complex
technological marvels that are part-and-parcel of our Lives today are the result of the
extraordinary cumulative efforts of our engineers, entrepreneurs, and others. And, such
achievements always call for the courage to risk failing in a large way. Yet, humans seem
naturally driven to make things bigger and more complex; thus refraining from doing so, or
reversing this natural process, takes considerable effort and courage of a different sort, as
discussed below.
The statement brings immediately to mind the ever-growing and increasingly complex digital
world. Today's high-tech firms seem compelled to boldly go to whatever effort is required to
devise increasingly complex products, for the ostensible purpose of staying ahead of their
competitors. Yet, the sort of effort and courage to which the statement refers is a different
one--bred of vision, imagination, and a willingness to forego near term profits for the prospect
of making lasting contributions. Surely, a number of entrepreneurs and engineers today are
mustering that courage, and are making the effort to create far simpler, yet more elegant,
technologies and applications, which will truly make our lives simpler in sharp contrast to
what computer technology has delivered to us so far.
Lending even more credence to the statement is the so-called "big government"
phenomenon. Human societies have a natural tendency to create unwieldy bureaucracies, a
fitting example of which is the U.S. tax-law system. The Intemal Revenue Code and its
accompanying Treasury Regulations have grown so voluminous and complex that many
certified accountants and tax attorneys admit that they cannot begin to understand it all.
Admittedly, this system has grown only through considerable effort on the part of all three
branches of the federal government, not to mention the efforts of many special interest groups.
Yet, therein lies the statement's credibility. It requires great effort and courage on the part of a
legislator to risk alienating special interest groups, thereby risking reelection prospects, by
standing on principle for a simpler tax system that is less costly to administer and better serves
the interests of most taxpayers.
Adding further credibility to the statement is the tendency of most people to complicate their
personal lives--a tendency that seems especially strong in today's age of technology and
consumerism. The greater our mobility, the greater our number of destinations each day; the
more time-saving gadgets we use, the more activities we try to pack into our day; and with
readier access to information we try to assimilate more of it each day. I am hard-pressed to
think of one person who has ever exclaimed to me how much effort and courage it has taken to
complicate his or her life in these respects. In contrast, a certain self-restraint and courage of
conviction are both required to eschew modern conveniences, to simplify one'sdaily schedule,
and to establish and adhere to a simple plan for the use of one's time and money.
In sum, whether we are building computer networks, government agencies, or personal
lifestyles, great effort and courage are required to make things simple, or to keep them that
way. Moreover, because humans na~traUy tend to make things big and complex, it arguably
requires more effort and courage to move in the opposite direction. In the final analysis,
making things simple---or keeping them that way--takes a brand of effort born of reflection and
restraint rather than sheer exertion, and a courage character and conviction rather than
unbridled ambition.
Issue 13
"Most people would agree that buildings represent a valuable record of any society's past, but
controversy arises when old buildings stand on ground that modern planners feel could be
better used for modern purposes. In such situations, modern development should be given
precedence over the preservation of historic buildings so that contemporary needs can be
served."
The speaker asserts that wherever a practical, utilitarian need for new buildings arises this
need should take precedence over our conflicting interest in preserving historic buildings as a
record of our past. In my view, however, which interest should take precedence should be
determined on a case-by-case basis--and should account not only for practical and historic
considerations but also aesthetic ones.
In determining whether to raze an older building, planners should of course consider the
community's current and anticipated utilitarian needs. For example, if an additional hospital is
needed to adequately serve the health-care needs of a fast-growing community, this
compelling interest might very well outweigh any interest in preserving a historic building that
sits on the proposed site. Or if additional parking is needed to ensure the economic survival of
a city's downtown district, this interest might take precedence over the historic value of an old
structure that stands in the way of a parking structure. On the other hand, if the need is mainly
for more office space, in some cases an architecturally appropriate add-on or annex to an
older building might serve just as well as razing the old building to make way for a new one. Of
course, an expensive retrofit might not be worthwhile if no amount of retrofitting would meet
the need.
Competing with a community's utilitarian needs is an interest preserving the historical record.
Again, the weight of this interest should be determined on a case-by-case basis. Perhaps an
older building uniquely represents a bygone era, or once played a central role in the city's
history as a municipal structure. Or perhaps the building once served as the home of a
founding family or other significant historical figure, or as the location of an important historical
event. Any of these scenarios might justify saving the building at the expense of the practical
needs of the community. On the other hand, if several older buildings represent the same
historical era just as effectively, or if the building's history is an unremarkable one, then the
historic value of the building might pale in comparison to the value of a new structure that
meets a compelling practical need.
Also competing with a community's utilitarian needs is the aesthetic and architectural value
of the building itself--apart from historical events with which it might be associated. A building
might be one of only a few that represents a certain architectural style. Or it might be especially
beautiful, perhaps as a result of the craftsmanship and materials employed in its
construction--which might be cost-prohibitive to replicate today. Even retrofitting the building to
accommodate current needs might undermine its aesthetic as well as historic value, by
altering its appearance and architectural integrity. Of course it is difficult to quantify aesthetic
value and weigh it against utilitarian considerations. Yet planners should strive to account for
aesthetic value nonetheless.
In sum, whether to raze an older building in order to construct a new one should never be
determined indiscriminately. Instead, planners should make such decisions on a case-by-case
basis, weighing the community's practical needs against the building's historic and aesthetic
value.
Issue 14
"Students should memorize facts only after they have studied the ideas, trends, and concepts
that help explain those facts. Students who have learned only facts have learned very little."
The speaker makes a threshold claim that students who learn only facts learn very little, then
condudes that students should always learn about concepts, ideas, and trends before they
memorize facts. While I wholeheartedly agree with the threshold claim, the condusion unfairly
generalizes about the learning process. In fact, following the speaker's advice would actually
impede the learning of concepts and ideas, as well as impeding the development of insightful
and useful new ones.
Turning first to the speaker's threshold daim, I strongly agree that ifwe learn only facts we
learn very little. Consider the task of memorizing the periodic table of dements, which any
student can memorize without any knowledge of chemistry, or that the table relates to
chemistry. Rote memorization of the table amounts to a bit of mental exercise-an opportunity to
practice memorization techniques and perhaps learn some new ones. Otherwise, the student
has learned very little about chemical dements, or about anything for that matter.
As for the speaker's ultimate claim, I concede that postponing the memorization of facts until
after one leams ideas and concepts holds certain advantages. With a conceptual framework
already in place a student is better able to understand the meaning of a fact, and to appreciate
its significance. As a result, the student is more likely to memorize the fact to begin with, and
less likely to forget it as time passes. Moreover, in my observation students whose first goal is
to memorize facts tend to stop there--for whatever reason. It seems that by focusing on facts
first students risk equating the learning process with the assimilation of trivia; in turn, students
risk learning nothing of much use in solving real world problems.
Conceding that students must learn ideas and concepts, as well as facts relating to them, in
order to learning anything meaningful, I nevertheless disagree that the former should always
precede the latter--for three reasons. In the first place, I see know reason why memorizing a
fact cannot precede learning about its meaning and significance--as long as the student does
not stop at rote memorization. Consider once again our hypothetical chemistry student. The
speaker might advise this student to first learn about the historical trends leading to the
discovery of the elements, or to learn about the concepts of altering chemical compounds to
achieve certain reactions--before studying the periodic table. Having no familiarity with the
basic vocabulary of chemistry, which includes the informarion in the periodic table, this student
would come away from the first two lessons bewildered and confused in other words, having
learned little.
In the second place, the speaker misunderstands the process by which we learn ideas and
concepts, and by which we develop new ones. Consider, for example, how economics
students learn about the relationship between supply and demand, and the resulting concept
of market equilibrium, and of surplus and shortage. Learning about the dynamics of supply and
demand involves (1) entertaining a theory, and perhaps even formulating a new one, (2)
testing hypothetical scenarios against the theory, and (3) examining real-world facts for the
purpose of confirming, refuting, modifying, or qualifying the theory. But which step should
come first? The speaker would have us follow steps 1 through 3 in that order. Yet, theories,
concepts, and ideas rarely materialize out of thin air; they generally emerge from empirical
observations--i.e., facts. Thus the speaker's notion about how we should learn concepts and
ideas gets the learning process backwards.
In the third place, strict adherence to the speaker's advice would surely lead to illconceived
ideas, concepts, and theories. Why? An idea or concept conjured up without the benefit of data
amounts to little more than the conjurer's hopes and desires. Accordingly, conjurers will tend to
seek out facts that support their prejudices and opinions, and overlook or avoid facts that
refute them. One telling example involves theories about the center of the universe.
Understandably, we ego-driven humans would prefer that the universe revolve around us.
Early theories presumed so for this reason, and facts that ran contrary to this ego-driven
theory were ignored, while observers of these facts were scorned and even vilified. In short,
students who strictly follow the speaker's prescription are unlikely to contribute significantly to
the advancement of knowledge.
To sum up, in a vacuum facts are meaningless, and only by filling that vacuum with ideas
and concepts can students learn, by gaining useful perspectives and insights about facts. Yet,
since facts are the very stuff from which ideas, concepts, and trends spring, without some facts
students cannot learn much of anything. In the final analysis, then, students should learn facts
right along with concepts, ideas, and trends.
Issue 15
"Unfortunately, the media tend to highlight what is sensational at the moment. Society would
be better served if the media reported or focused more fully on events and trends that will
ultimately have the most long-term significance."
The speaker asserts that rather than merely highlighting certain sensational events the
media should provide complete coverage of more important events. While the speaker's
assertion has merit from a normative standpoint, in the final analysis I find this assertion
indefensible.
Upon first impression the speaker's claim seems quite compelling, for two reasons. First,
without the benefit of a complete, unfiltered, and balanced account of current events, it is
impossible to develop an informed and intelligent opinion about important social and political
issues and, in turn, to contribute meaningfully to our democratic society, which relies on broad
participation in an ongoing debate about such issues to steer a proper course. The end result
of our being a largely uninformed people is that we relegate the most important decisions to a
handful of legislators, jurists, and executives who may or may not know what is best for us.
Second, by focusing on the "sensational"--by which I take the speaker to mean
comparatively shocking, entertaining, and titillating events which easily catch one's
attention-the media appeal to our emotions and baser instincts, rather than to our intellect and
reason. Any observant person could list many examples aptly illustrating the trend in this
direction--from trashy talk shows and local news broadcasts to The National Enquixer and
People Magazine. This trend dearly serves to undermine a society's collective sensibilities and
renders a society's members more vulnerable to demagoguery; thus we should all abhor and
resist the trend.
However, for several reasons I find the media's current trend toward highlights and the
sensational to be justifiable. First, the world is becoming an increasingly eventful place; thus
with each passing year it becomes a more onerous task for the media to attempt full news
coverage. Second, we are becoming an increasingly busy society. The average U.S. worker
spends nearly 60 hours per week at work now; and in most families both spouses work.
Compare this startlingly busy pace to the pace a generation ago, when one bread-winner
worked just over 40 hours per week. We have far less time today for news, so highlights must
suffice. Third, the media does in fact provide full coverage of important events; anyone can find
such coverage beyond their newspaper's front page, on daily PBS news programs, and on the
Internet. I would wholeheartedly agree with the speaker if the sensational highlights were all
the media were willing or permitted to provide; this scenario would be tantamount to thought
control on a mass scale and would serve to undermine our free society. However, I am aware
of no evidence of any trend in this direction. To the contrary, in my observation the media are
informing us more fully than ever before; we just need to seek out that information.
On balance, then, the speaker's claim is not defensible. In the final analysis the media
serves its proper function by merely providing what we in a free society demand. Thus any
argument about how the media should or should not behave--regardless of its merits from a
normative standpoint begs the question.
the world's lesser-known languages
Many of the world's lesser-known languages are being lost as fewer and fewer people speak them. The governments of countries in which these languages are spoken should act to prevent such languages from becoming extinct.
The speaker asserts that governments of countries where lesser-known languages are
spoken should intervene to prevent these languages from becoming extinct. I agree inso far as
a country's indigenous and distinct languages should not be abandoned and forgot ten
altogether. At some point, however, I think cultural identity should yield to the more practical
considerations of day-to-day life in a global society.
On the one hand, the indigenous language of any geographical region is part-and-parcel of
the cultural heritage of the region's natives. In my observation we humans have a basic
psychological need for individual identity, which we define by way of our membership in distinct
cultural groups. A culture defines itself in various ways--by its unique traditions, rituals, mores,
attitudes and beliefs, but especially language. Therefore, when a people's language becomes
extinct the result is a diminished sense of pride, dignity, and self- worth.
One need look no further than continental Europe to observe how people cling tenaciously
to their distinct languages, despite the fact that there is no practical need for them anymore.
And on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, the French Canadians stubbornly insist on French
as their official language, for the sole purpose of preserving their distinct cultural heritage.
Even where no distinct language exists, people will invent one to gain a sense of cultural
identity, as the emergence of the distinct Ebonic cant among today's African Americans aptly
illustrates. In short, people resist language assimilation because of a basic human need to be
part of a distinct cultural group.
Another important reason to prevent the extinction of a language is to preserve the distinct
ideas that only that particular language can convey. Certain Native American and Oriental
languages, for instance, contain words symbolizing spiritual and other abstract concepts that
only these cultures embrace. Thus, in some cases to lose a language would be to abandon
cherished beliefs and ideas that can be conveyed only through language.
On the other hand, in today's high-tech world of satellite communications, global mobility,
and especially the Internet, language barriers serve primarily to impede cross-cultural
communication, which in turn impedes international commerce and trade. Moreover, language
barriers naturally breed misunderstanding, a certain distrust and, as a result, discord and even
war among nations. Moreover, in my view the extinction of all but a few major languages is
inexorable--as supported by the fact that the Internet has adopted English as its official
language. Thus by intervening to preserve a dying language a government might be deploying
its resources to fight a losing battle, rather than to combat more pressing social
problems--such as hunger, homelessness, disease and ignorance--that plague nearly every
society today.
In sum, preserving indigenous languages is, admittedly, a worthy goal; maintaining its own
distinct language affords a people a sense of pride, dignity and self-worth. Moreover, by
preserving languages we honor a people's heritage, enhance our understanding of history, and
preserve certain ideas that only some languages properly convey. Nevertheless, the economic
and political drawbacks of language barriers outweigh the benefits of preserving a dying
language. In the final analysis, government should devote its time and resources elsewhere,
and leave it to the people themselves to take whatever steps are needed to preserve their own distinct languages.
The speaker asserts that governments of countries where lesser-known languages are
spoken should intervene to prevent these languages from becoming extinct. I agree inso far as
a country's indigenous and distinct languages should not be abandoned and forgot ten
altogether. At some point, however, I think cultural identity should yield to the more practical
considerations of day-to-day life in a global society.
On the one hand, the indigenous language of any geographical region is part-and-parcel of
the cultural heritage of the region's natives. In my observation we humans have a basic
psychological need for individual identity, which we define by way of our membership in distinct
cultural groups. A culture defines itself in various ways--by its unique traditions, rituals, mores,
attitudes and beliefs, but especially language. Therefore, when a people's language becomes
extinct the result is a diminished sense of pride, dignity, and self- worth.
One need look no further than continental Europe to observe how people cling tenaciously
to their distinct languages, despite the fact that there is no practical need for them anymore.
And on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, the French Canadians stubbornly insist on French
as their official language, for the sole purpose of preserving their distinct cultural heritage.
Even where no distinct language exists, people will invent one to gain a sense of cultural
identity, as the emergence of the distinct Ebonic cant among today's African Americans aptly
illustrates. In short, people resist language assimilation because of a basic human need to be
part of a distinct cultural group.
Another important reason to prevent the extinction of a language is to preserve the distinct
ideas that only that particular language can convey. Certain Native American and Oriental
languages, for instance, contain words symbolizing spiritual and other abstract concepts that
only these cultures embrace. Thus, in some cases to lose a language would be to abandon
cherished beliefs and ideas that can be conveyed only through language.
On the other hand, in today's high-tech world of satellite communications, global mobility,
and especially the Internet, language barriers serve primarily to impede cross-cultural
communication, which in turn impedes international commerce and trade. Moreover, language
barriers naturally breed misunderstanding, a certain distrust and, as a result, discord and even
war among nations. Moreover, in my view the extinction of all but a few major languages is
inexorable--as supported by the fact that the Internet has adopted English as its official
language. Thus by intervening to preserve a dying language a government might be deploying
its resources to fight a losing battle, rather than to combat more pressing social
problems--such as hunger, homelessness, disease and ignorance--that plague nearly every
society today.
In sum, preserving indigenous languages is, admittedly, a worthy goal; maintaining its own
distinct language affords a people a sense of pride, dignity and self-worth. Moreover, by
preserving languages we honor a people's heritage, enhance our understanding of history, and
preserve certain ideas that only some languages properly convey. Nevertheless, the economic
and political drawbacks of language barriers outweigh the benefits of preserving a dying
language. In the final analysis, government should devote its time and resources elsewhere,
and leave it to the people themselves to take whatever steps are needed to preserve their own distinct languages.
All nations should help support the development of a global university designed to engage students in the process of solving the world's most...
I agree that it would serve the interests of all nations to establish a global university for the
purpose of solving the world's most persistent social problems. Nevertheless, such a university
poses certain risks which all participating nations must be careful to minimize--or risk defeating
the university's purpose.
One compelling argument in favor of a global university has to do with the fact that its faculty
and students would bring diverse cultural and educational perspectives to the problems they
seek to solve. It seems to me that nations can only benefit from a global university where
students learn ways in which other nations address certain soda] problems-successfully or not.
It might be tempting to think that an overly diversified academic community would impede
communication among students and faculty. However, in my view any such concerns are
unwarranted, especially considering the growing awareness of other peoples and cultures
which the mass media, and especially the Internet, have created. Moreover, many basic
principles used to solve enduring social problems know no national boundaries; thus a useful
insight or discovery can come from a researcher or student from any nation.
Another compelling argument for a global university involves the increasingly global nature
of certain problems. Consider, for instance, the depletion of atmospheric ozone, which has
wanned the Earth to the point that it threatens the very survival of the human species. Also, we
are now learning that dear-cutting the world's rainforests can set into motion a chain of animal
extinction that threatens the delicate balance upon which all animals--including
humans--depend. Also consider that a financial crisis---or a political crisis or natural disaster
in one country can spell trouble for foreign companies, many of which are now multinational in
that they rely on the labor forces, equipment, and raw materials of other nations.
Environmental, economic, and political problems such as these all carry grave social
consequences--increased crime, unemployment, insurrection, hunger, and so forth. Solving
these problems requires global cooperation--which a global university can facilitate.
Notwithstanding the foregoing reasons why a global university would help solve many of our
most pressing social problems, the establishment of such a university poses certain problems
of its own which must be addressed in order that the university can achieve its objectives. First,
participant nations would need to overcome a myriad of administrative and political
impediments. All nations would need to agree on which problems demand the university's
attention and resources, which areas of academic research are worthwhile, as well as
agreeing on policies and procedures for making, enforcing, and amending these decisions.
Query whether a functional global university is politically feasible, given that sovereign nations
naturally wish to advance their own agendas.
"All nations should help support the development of a global university designed to engage students in the process of solving the world's most persistent social problems."
purpose of solving the world's most persistent social problems. Nevertheless, such a university
poses certain risks which all participating nations must be careful to minimize--or risk defeating
the university's purpose.
One compelling argument in favor of a global university has to do with the fact that its faculty
and students would bring diverse cultural and educational perspectives to the problems they
seek to solve. It seems to me that nations can only benefit from a global university where
students learn ways in which other nations address certain soda] problems-successfully or not.
It might be tempting to think that an overly diversified academic community would impede
communication among students and faculty. However, in my view any such concerns are
unwarranted, especially considering the growing awareness of other peoples and cultures
which the mass media, and especially the Internet, have created. Moreover, many basic
principles used to solve enduring social problems know no national boundaries; thus a useful
insight or discovery can come from a researcher or student from any nation.
Another compelling argument for a global university involves the increasingly global nature
of certain problems. Consider, for instance, the depletion of atmospheric ozone, which has
wanned the Earth to the point that it threatens the very survival of the human species. Also, we
are now learning that dear-cutting the world's rainforests can set into motion a chain of animal
extinction that threatens the delicate balance upon which all animals--including
humans--depend. Also consider that a financial crisis---or a political crisis or natural disaster
in one country can spell trouble for foreign companies, many of which are now multinational in
that they rely on the labor forces, equipment, and raw materials of other nations.
Environmental, economic, and political problems such as these all carry grave social
consequences--increased crime, unemployment, insurrection, hunger, and so forth. Solving
these problems requires global cooperation--which a global university can facilitate.
Notwithstanding the foregoing reasons why a global university would help solve many of our
most pressing social problems, the establishment of such a university poses certain problems
of its own which must be addressed in order that the university can achieve its objectives. First,
participant nations would need to overcome a myriad of administrative and political
impediments. All nations would need to agree on which problems demand the university's
attention and resources, which areas of academic research are worthwhile, as well as
agreeing on policies and procedures for making, enforcing, and amending these decisions.
Query whether a functional global university is politically feasible, given that sovereign nations
naturally wish to advance their own agendas.
"All nations should help support the development of a global university designed to engage students in the process of solving the world's most persistent social problems."
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